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The development of Asian bond markets
1 
Barry Eichengreen  
1. The  problem 
The 1997-98 crisis in Asia prompted considerable rethinking of the role of financial markets 
in the region’s economic development. Banks had long been at the centre of Asian financial 
systems. For a set of late-developing economies with urgent needs for financial 
intermediation, banking systems were easier to get up and running. Governments could 
supply the equity capital and in some cases the managerial talent. Close cooperation 
between banks and governments allowed the authorities to influence the flow of funds - 
ideally, to ensure that finance flowed towards sectors that were the locus of productivity 
spillovers and generators of export revenues. Large corporations in need of funding for 
expensive investment projects that might require a lengthy incubation period could be 
confident of a stable source of external finance.  
Up to the mid-1990s this bank-centred financial system was one of the foundation stones of 
East Asian economic growth. The crisis that followed then revealed that this form of financial 
organisation also had serious weaknesses. The short maturity of bank loans meant that 
when confidence was disturbed, as happened in 1997-98, what had once been a set of 
patient lenders might not be so patient any more. Seeing their funding decline, banks might 
call in their loans, subjecting their borrowers to a painful credit crunch. Moreover, with the 
opening of capital accounts, banks might be in a favoured position to access foreign funds, 
not least because of the perception that their obligations were guaranteed by the public 
sector. They aggressively extended their intermediation role by borrowing offshore and 
onlending the proceeds to domestic customers. Generally, the tenor of these foreign credits 
was even shorter than that of the banks’ own loans, exposing them to a maturity mismatch 
that might cause serious problems if confidence was shaken. Since most foreign funds were 
denominated in dollars, euros or yen, the banks were exposed to either a dangerous 
currency risk if they onlent in local currency or an equally serious credit risk if they onlent in 
those same foreign currencies. Meanwhile, deregulation allowed banks to take on additional 
risks using techniques with which supervisors found it difficult to keep pace. And insofar as 
the banks had allowed themselves to be utilised as instrumentalities of the government’s 
industrial policies, they anticipated help from the official sector in the event of difficulties. 
Thus, the moral hazard inevitably associated with the existence of a financial safety net 
appears to have been particularly pervasive in the Asian case. 
This episode of financial turmoil led to the restructuring of banking systems and to efforts at 
upgrading their supervision and regulation. But it also created an awareness of the need for 
better diversified debt markets and specifically for bond markets to supplement the 
availability of bank finance. Bank and bond finance have different advantages. Bonds and 
securitised finance generally are thought to have better risk-sharing characteristics. Risks 
can be more efficiently diversified when they are spread across a large number of individual 
security holders. This spreading of risks and the existence of liquid secondary markets in 
standardised securities encourages creditors to make long-term commitments and allows 
debtors to borrow for extended periods of time. 
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Banks, in contrast, have a comparative advantage in the information-impacted segment of 
the economy. They invest in building dedicated monitoring technologies. (This is one way of 
thinking about what distinguishes banks from other financial market participants.) 
Consequently they are well placed to identify and lend to small, recently established 
enterprises about which public information is scarce. In addition, by pooling the deposits of 
households and firms with non-synchronised demands for liquidity, they are able to provide 
maturity transformation services for small savers reluctant to lock up their funds for extended 
periods. As concentrated stakeholders, they contribute to effective corporate governance and 
are prepared to incur the costs of litigation when legal recourse is required. 
The point is not that banks or bond markets are better; there is little systematic evidence of 
the unconditional superiority of one financial form over the other. Rather, there is a growing 
body of evidence that countries benefit from well diversified financial systems with a role for 
both well regulated banks and well functioning securities markets.
2 Banks have a 
comparative advantage in providing external finance to smaller, younger firms operating in 
information-impacted segments of the economy, while securities markets, including debt 
markets, do the job more efficiently for large, well established companies. Similarly, banks 
and securities markets are subject to different risks. Hence, in financial structure, as in other 
areas, diversification may help an economy attain a superior position on the frontier of 
feasible risk-return trade-offs. That is, the existence of a well diversified financial system, with 
a role for both banks and securities markets, should be conducive both to an efficient 
allocation of resources compatible with sustainable medium-term economic growth and to 
financial stability - and specifically to minimisation of the risk of late 1990s-style financial 
crises. 
2.  The policy response 
It is in this context that recent efforts to foster the development of Asian bond markets should 
be understood. These efforts have focused on the development of a more robust and 
efficient market infrastructure at the national and regional levels. Among the prominent 
initiatives in this area is the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) of the ASEAN+3 countries.
3 
As endorsed by ASEAN+3 finance ministers at their August 2003 meeting in Manila, the 
ABMI takes as its goal the development of more robust and efficient primary and secondary 
markets. To this end ASEAN+3 has established working groups concerned with the creation 
of standardised debt instruments, the establishment of rating agencies, the provision of 
technical assistance, foreign exchange transactions and settlement issues, credit guarantee 
mechanisms, and the role of multilateral development banks, foreign government agencies 
and Asian multinational corporations in issuing in local markets and local currencies.  
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These working groups can be seen as mechanisms for sharing information and providing 
technical assistance about best practice in fostering and regulating bond markets. They can 
be seen as working towards the establishment of benchmarks for the development of market 
infrastructure against which national policy and practice can be assessed. Private sector 
practice has shown such benchmarks to be an effective focal point for reform.
4 The working 
groups may thus function as a source of peer pressure for governments to move more 
quickly in the direction of creating active and liquid bond markets than they might otherwise, 
something that is desirable insofar as the official sector often enjoys privileged access to 
bank finance and therefore faces a moral hazard of its own.  
Other initiatives seek to remove the obstacles to the development of a pan-Asian bond 
market. They seek to encourage Asian investors to build regional bond portfolios by 
removing obstacles to cross-border capital flows and by harmonising the regulations, 
withholding tax provisions, accounting practices, rating conventions and clearing and 
settlement systems that pose obstacles to foreign participation in regional bond markets. 
These initiatives respond to the perception that the small size of Asian bond markets is part 
of what limits their liquidity, efficiency and growth. To be attractive for investors, a bond 
market must operate at a certain minimum efficient scale. Otherwise market participants will 
not be able to acquire or dispose of their holdings without moving prices.
5 Small markets with 
a limited number of participants may also create scope for strategic behaviour by competitors 
and counterparties to deter entry and participation by other investors.
6 There may exist 
significant scale efficiency effects in clearing and settlement, payment system data 
processing, trading operations, firm-specific information processing activities (such as 
listing), and even regulation.
7 In addition, a small market may not be able to develop liquidity 
in the full range of marketable instruments, including the derivative instruments needed by 
investors to hedge market risk, which in turn may deter participation.
8 For all these reasons, 
small countries may find it difficult to develop deep and liquid bond markets. Securing foreign 
participation through the removal of impediments to cross-border issuance and investment is 
in turn a potential way around this problem.  
The most prominent initiative in this area the Asian Bond Fund created by the Executives’ 
Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP).
9 Launched in June 2003, the Asian 
Bond Fund (ABF) had an initial size of US$1 billion. It invests in a basket of US dollar-
denominated bonds issued by Asian sovereign and quasi-sovereign issuers in EMEAP 
countries other than Japan, Australia and New Zealand. It is managed by the Bank for 
International Settlements and supervised by an EMEAP Oversight Committee. A second 
Asian Bond Fund, under discussion at the time of writing, is to include investments in bond 
denominated in regional currencies issued by sovereigns, quasi-sovereigns and creditworthy 
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companies.
10 By encouraging the reinvestment of central bank reserves in the qualifying 
bond markets and securities of the region, the ABF initiative can be seen as helping to 
augment the installed base of local securities holdings and thus overcome the problem of 
inadequate scale. More generally this initiative can be seen as one of a set of measures 
designed to foster the development of a deep and liquid bond market at the regional level. 
3. Dilemmas 
There is an almost instinctual tendency on the part of economists to applaud such efforts, 
given the compelling nature of the arguments for developing more active bond markets to 
round out Asia’s bank-dominated financial systems. But there is also a dilemma. In reality 
what we are talking about is capital account convertibility, and capital account convertibility in 
advance of the development of regional financial markets. This, of course, is the opposite of 
what most of us thought that we had learned from the Asian crisis about the right time at 
which to liberalise the capital account. One of the key lessons of the Asian crisis is that it is 
important to have strong, diversified and well developed domestic financial markets, 
including by implication bond markets, before liberalising the capital account. If financial 
markets are underdeveloped, market discipline will be weak, and banks and firms will be 
prone to overborrow. Capital account liberalisation will then cause funds to flow in through 
the banking system. Cheap funding will encourage the banks to expand their loan portfolios, 
resulting in a decline in the average quality of loan projects. Maturity mismatches will be 
accentuated if banks use this short-term finance to fund long-term loans, and currency 
mismatches will result either for the banks (if they lend in local currency) or their customers 
(if their loans are denominated in foreign currency but the borrowers are active in the 
production of non-traded goods - as in the case of construction firms). If the flow of foreign 
capital then turns around, the whole financial edifice can come crashing down. The Asian 
crisis is a stark reminder of the havoc that can be wreaked by this combination of 
circumstances. 
Thus, macroeconomists will insist that governments should not proceed with capital account 
liberalisation unless they have first made progress in developing local bond markets. And 
market participants will insist that countries cannot have local bond market development 
unless they first have open capital accounts. Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister of 
Singapore and head of that country’s Monetary Authority, put the point well in an address 
given in 2002: “There is a trade-off between tightening up the capital account, and 
developing the bond markets. Measures to restrict offshore foreign currency trading have 
been effective, in so far as reducing or eliminating offshore markets is concerned. But these 
safeguards come at a cost - they also hinder the development of capital markets, especially 
the bond markets. Size and liquidity are essential attributes for a market to attract 
international interest. Already in size and liquidity, we clearly lag behind our counterparts in 
the West. If Asian markets are fragmented and unable to grow, they risk being ignored by 
global investors.”
11  
Thus, Asia would seem to be in a classic Catch-22 situation. Without removing capital 
controls, attempting to foster domestic bond markets can be an uphill fight. Yet trying to win it 
by removing restrictions on the ability of residents and foreigners to invest across borders 
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could be a risky strategy. It is widely recognised that these trade-offs are implicit in efforts to 
build domestic bond markets by removing capital controls.
12 What is less well understood is 
that even seemingly benign steps like harmonising regulations and taxation, or creating an 
Asian rating agency (or a common standard for national rating agencies), or using central 
bank reserves to jump-start private cross-border investment are the equivalent of capital 
account liberalisation in the sense that they too would work to encourage cross-border 
capital flows. This is their intent, and it would certainly be their effect. And these measures 
create risks - as well as conflicting with the conventional wisdom regarding sequencing - 
insofar as they encourage capital mobility first and only produce stronger markets later. 
The positive message is that governments should proceed with all due speed to strengthen 
market infrastructure at the national level: more efficient clearing and settlement systems, 
more efficient information provision and assessment (through inter alia the establishment of 
disclosure requirements for issuers and the creation of rating agencies), stronger creditor 
rights and the development of benchmark assets and yield curves. Even small countries can 
make progress in this direction, although they may have to forgo some of the cost savings 
associated with the scale efficiency effects enumerated above. They can also overcome 
some of the disadvantages of small market capitalisation by consolidating the public debt 
and overfunding their fiscal needs.
13 One reading of European experience from the 1950s to 
the 1980s is that, through the dedicated pursuit of such measures, reasonably robust and 
liquid markets in debt securities can be created.
14 At that point it becomes safe to remove 
residual capital controls, as Europe did in the 1990s, and to encourage market participants to 
build pan-regional portfolios.  
This perspective suggests that Asian countries, especially lower-income Asian countries with 
a less developed financial infrastructure, should proceed cautiously with capital account 
liberalisation. It suggests that a relatively small Asian Bond Fund (recall that an ABF-I funded 
to the tune of US$1 billion compares with regional bond markets with a market capitalisation 
of some US$1.5 trillion) is appropriate in that it does not put the cart before the horse. That 
is, it does not commit Asian central banks to large amounts of cross-border portfolio 
investment before a stronger market infrastructure is in place. It suggests that efforts to foster 
the development of bond markets should focus, in the first instance, on measures to 
strengthen the market infrastructure at the national level and not on measures to harmonise 
and integrate those market structures, thereby encouraging cross-border capital flows, per 
se. Measures to harmonise and integrate institutions and regulations should come later, once 
those stronger market structures are in place. 
The other issue raised by Europe’s experience in creating a regional bond market is the role 
of the exchange rate. In Europe, the elimination of currency risk by the creation of the euro 
strongly stimulated the development of regional bond markets. This is evident in the dramatic 
increase in corporate bond issuance, speculative grade issuance in particular, following the 
irrevocable locking of exchange rates in 1999, and in the adoption of the 10-year German 
government bond as the benchmark issue for the region.
15 This experience suggests that an 
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13   See McCauley (2003). 
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exchange rate regime that minimises currency risk can lend strong stimulus to the 
development of regional bond markets by encouraging investors to build pan-regional 
portfolios, thereby enhancing market liquidity and in turn inducing additional issuance and 
investment. The paper by Barry Eichengreen and Pipat Luengnaruemitchai in this volume 
provides further support for this association between exchange rate stability and bond market 
capitalisation. 
For Asia, these facts again create something of a dilemma. Another widely drawn lesson of 
the Asian crisis is that countries should gravitate towards more flexible exchange rate 
regimes in order to limit crisis risk and be able to better tailor domestic money and credit 
conditions to local needs. Moreover, the presumption that Asian countries will continue to 
move down the road towards capital account convertibility reinforces the argument for 
greater exchange rate flexibility, insofar as moving to managed flexibility is an essential 
precondition for full capital account liberalisation.
16 Hence, the exchange rate regime 
consistent with financial stability in the short run may not be conducive to bond market 
development in the longer run. 
The severity of this problem is not entirely clear. The observation that countries with more 
stable exchange rates have better capitalised bond markets is based on an all-else-equal 
comparison. In practice, everything else may not be equal. In particular, macroeconomic 
policies that minimise currency risk by holding exchange rates stable may heighten credit risk 
by encouraging banks, firms and governments to borrow more freely, thereby exposing them 
to financial distress when cyclical conditions deteriorate. Robert McCauley and Guorong 
Jiang (2004) find a closer conformance of bond yields across countries with flexible 
exchange rates. One interpretation is that credit risk is even more important than currency 
risk in driving a wedge between national markets and that in countries where the bulk of debt 
is domestic currency denominated these two forms of risk are negatively correlated. If this is 
right, then greater exchange rate flexibility may not in the end be an impediment to bond 
market development.  
The other solution, also suggested by European experience, is monetary unification to 
reconcile the desire for exchange rate stability with the reality of capital account convertibility, 
along with stronger financial market institutions and regulation to prevent overborrowing and 
avoid unnecessary credit risk. From this point of view the Chiang Mai Initiative for swap lines 
and other financial supports, ongoing discussions of a collective currency peg and initiatives 
to foster the development of bond markets are of a piece. That is to say, these various efforts 
to further economic and financial development and cooperation at the regional level are 
complementary to one another. The problem is that the time horizon relevant to these 
different initiatives is not the same. While furthering the development of bond markets is an 
urgent task that should be advanced now in order to foster growth and buttress financial 
stability, monetary unification is a long-run objective that presupposes a significantly more 
extensive political commitment.
17  
The other question in this context is whether Asia is the right level at which to pursue these 
objectives. A positive answer is generally presupposed in discussions of exchange rate 
stabilisation and monetary unification. There is both the European precedent and the fact of 
rapidly growing intraregional trade and foreign investment linkages, heavily centred on 
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China. But it is not clear that a positive answer is appropriate in discussions of bond market 
development. There already exist well developed global securities markets into which Asian 
countries can link, as emphasised by Robert McCauley and Yung Chul Park in their 
contribution to this volume. Many of the large issuers and large investors - multilateral 
institutions, foreign government agencies and multinational corporations alike - whose 
participation in local markets is desired are headquartered outside Asia. Harmonising 
institutions and policies across Asian countries is not the most obvious way of encouraging 
their participation; better would be to harmonise institutions and regulations with those 
prevailing in global markets. Even if the answer to the question of whether Asian countries 
should attempt to integrate into global or regional bond markets is not obvious, that question 
should at least be asked.  
4.  The papers that follow 
The papers that follow shed additional light on a number of these issues. In keeping with the 
thematic structure of this introduction, I review these papers in a somewhat different order 
than they appear below. 
Atsushi Takeuchi’s paper sets the stage by describing the rationale for the development of 
deeper and more liquid bond markets, the progress that has been made to date and the 
obstacles going forward. As the author notes, the size of local bond markets in Asia, as 
measured by the volume of issuance, has more than doubled since 1998. However, 
secondary markets remain relatively illiquid, and foreign participation, in particular, is 
disappointing. Takeuchi highlights capital controls, taxation, the difficulty of cross-border 
clearing and settlement, and the limited availability of hedging instruments as obstacles to 
greater participation by nonresidents.  
Barry Eichengreen and Pipat Luengnaruemitchai further set the stage by using multiple 
regression and cross-country comparisons to analyse the obstacles to the development of 
Asian bond markets. While a variety of alternative explanations have been offered in the 
past, Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai show that bond market undercapitalisation in Asia 
is in fact a phenomenon with multiple causes. To some extent the problem is one of 
minimum efficient scale: smaller countries find it more difficult to develop well capitalised 
bond markets (even when capitalisation is measured relative to GDP). But market size is not 
the entire problem. In addition, corruption and low bureaucratic quality, which are signs of 
unreliable securities market regulation, and the failure of countries to follow internationally 
recognised accounting and disclosure standards have slowed the development of debt 
markets. Macroeconomic policy, for its part, appears to have played both a supporting and 
impeding role. On the one hand, Asia’s strong fiscal balances, while admirable on other 
grounds, have not been conducive to the growth of government bond markets. At the same 
time, there is little evidence that the small size of public debt markets is a serious obstacle to 
corporate bond market development. And the stability of exchange rates in the region 
appears, if anything, to have encouraged bond market development.  
Robert McCauley, in his paper, builds on the observation that small countries find it difficult to 
achieve the minimum efficient scale required for a deep and efficient bond market. He notes 
that the sterilisation operations engaged in by Asian central banks in the process of 
accumulating international reserves have provided an opportunity to get a larger installed 
base of public debt securities into the market. The problem is that the market has been 
segmented into government debt and central bank debt. McCauley therefore recommends 
consolidating this debt into a uniform set of securities by “overfunding” the fiscal deficit 
(issuing more government debt securities than needed to fund the deficit, and purchasing 
central bank bills in return). Finance ministries may be reluctant to permit the de facto 
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other things, doing so is likely to undermine their control of the public debt market. But they 
still may wish to consider this alternative if they attach priority to the creation of a liquid 
domestic market in public debt. 
Kee-Hong Bae, Warren Bailey and Young-Sup Yun look more closely at the issue of foreign 
participation, analysing data gathered by the IMF for 165 countries on the holdings of local 
bonds by foreign investors. They find that measures of property rights protection similar to 
those analysed by Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai - corruption, risk of expropriation of 
private property and the risk that contracts may be repudiated - are the most influential 
determinants of foreign participation. By comparison, they find little evidence of a role for 
macroeconomic variables like inflation, interest rates and the volatility of growth. This 
reinforces the message that countries seeking to develop their bond markets, and specifically 
to encourage foreign participation, should focus on building investment-friendly institutions. 
Atsushi Taneuchi, in a companion paper, examines these same issues and in addition 
characterises the obstacles to non-resident issuance. Compared to Bae, Bailey and Yun, he 
puts more emphasis on statutory restrictions such as capital controls, the opacity and lack of 
uniformity of withholding tax regimes, and the absence of adequate instruments for hedging 
interest rate and currency exposures. 
Martin Hohensee and Kyungjik Lee pursue the problem of hedging instruments, both those 
traded on futures exchanges and over-the-counter interest rate derivatives such as interest 
rate swaps and options. They show that Hong Kong and Singapore, two of the leading bond 
markets in the region, also have the most advanced derivatives markets - a fact that is surely 
not coincidental. It is impossible to imagine the development of the relevant hedging markets 
absent the growth of the underlying bond market, for without trading in the underlying bonds 
there would be nothing on which to base the swaps and options in question. The growth of 
hedging markets in Hong Kong and Singapore thus reflects the success of these centres in 
growing their local bond markets. But it also reflects a transparent and flexible regulatory 
regime, which provides market participants the opportunity and the incentive to engage in 
derivative transactions. While other Asian countries have launched their own derivatives 
markets, these remain relatively illiquid. This suggests that markets in the relevant hedging 
instruments tend to develop as a natural by-product of bond market development, although 
their growth can also be fostered by putting in place a transparent, market-friendly regulatory 
regime.  
The case for developing local bond markets is strongest to the extent that the resulting 
issues are long in tenor and denominated in local currency, thereby helping to relieve the 
double mismatch problem. David Fernandez and Simon Klassen focus on the currency 
mismatch aspect, analysing the choice of currency by East Asian bond issuers. In contrast to 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, they argue for the existence of strong spillovers 
between the sovereign and corporate segments of the market. They conclude that sovereign 
issuance has played a catalytic role in the genesis of regional bond markets, this despite the 
constraints resulting from the traditionally strong fiscal stance of Asian governments. Since 
the Asian crisis, however, sovereign issuance has soared, and corporate issues have 
followed in its train. Indeed, as the authors emphasise, corporate issuance has been the 
most rapidly growing segment of Asian bond markets in the last five years. The constraint on 
the further growth of the corporate market, they suggest, is not so much inadequate supply 
as inadequate demand - or at least a mismatch in the structure of supply and demand. High-
grade corporates have either ample retained earnings or easy access to equity finance; 
hence much of the potential supply of corporate bonds is from sub-investment grade credits. 
The demand, from institutional investors in particular, is however for investment grade debt 
securities (given restrictive covenants, regulations, etc). One potential solution to this 
problem is the development of structured products that allow investors to unpack credit risk 
from other characteristics of debt securities. While the market in structured products is 
growing as well, Fernandez and Klassen suggest that Asian financial institutions, which are BIS Papers No 30  9
 
potential suppliers of such products, need to develop further their expertise and involvement 
in this area. 
Another potential way of addressing this supply-demand imbalance is the provision of credit 
guarantees. Gyutaeg Oh and Jaeha Park argue that the most important constraint on the 
development of local currency bond markets is not weakness of creditor rights, imperfections 
in the rating function or the absence of a pan-Asian clearing and settlement system, but the 
absence of credit guarantees. The underlying constraint to bond market development in the 
region, they argue, is the mismatch between the credit quality of potential issuers (which is 
often speculative grade) and the credit quality required by provident funds, insurance 
companies and other institutions (which, as noted, are often required or prefer to limit their 
holdings to investment grade securities). Guarantees against credit and political risk could 
bridge this gap, Oh and Park argue: they would guarantee a high rating for issuers, facilitate 
the securitisation of outstanding debts, broaden the investor base and improve marketability 
by limiting the danger of downgrades. To this end the authors propose the creation of either 
public-private partnerships or multilateral institutions to provide guarantees for qualifying 
Asian issuers. The question here is why, if there is a demand for such insurance, private 
agencies have not sprung up to screen potential customers and provide this service at a 
price. And if the answer is that there exist distortions preventing the market from doing this 
job, then there is still the danger that the public provision of guarantees will only reintroduce 
in another guise the moral hazard problem that arose in the 1990s as a result of the 
commercial banks’ implicit guarantees. 
One model for Asian countries seeking to develop their bond markets is Japan, which has a 
large and highly liquid debt market. Fumiaki Nishi and Alexander Vergus consider the history, 
structure and prospects of this market. They show that government debt dominates the 
Japanese market, not surprisingly given the large budget deficits run by the government in 
the 1990s in the effort to jump-start a deflation-ridden economy.
18 Their conclusion is that the 
Japanese corporate bond market has developed relatively slowly due to the long-standing 
dominance of Japanese banks over the country’s corporate finance. In this sense Japan is 
not a reassuring precedent for other Asian countries, which similarly inherit financial systems 
heavily dominated by commercial banks. 
Japan also provides lessons, as Nishi and Vergus shows, for Asian countries seeking to 
encourage foreign participation in their local bond markets. The first yen-denominated bond 
publicly offered by a non-resident issuer in the domestic market was issued by the Asian 
Development Bank in 1970. This was followed by sovereign issues by Singapore in 1976 and 
the Korea Development Bank in 1978. As controls on non-resident issuance in yen were 
gradually relaxed, a variety of foreign corporate issuers followed, creating the so-called 
“Samurai market”.
19 However, the development of the Samurai market has been relatively 
slow, a disappointing record that the authors attribute the onerous regulations and 
registration requirements imposed by the Japanese authorities - and that might be best 
avoided by other Asian governments. 
The remaining papers consider challenges for the development of market infrastructure, a 
task that emerges from these analyses as a key step for countries seeking to foster local 
bond markets. Kate Kisselev and Frank Packer consider the rating function, focusing on the 
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to creating a local currency benchmark asset and stimulating liquidity, such issuance provides an instrument 
that local issuers tapping foreign currency bond markets can use to swap out of their foreign currency 
exposures, limiting the currency mismatch problem. 10  BIS Papers No 30
 
rating of local currency bonds. Transparent and efficient ratings are essential to creating a 
broad and diversified customer base for local currency bonds. But, as Kisselev and Packer 
show, local currency sovereign bonds often receive very different ratings than the foreign 
currency issues of the same governments. Rating agencies tend to give higher ratings to 
local currency issues on the grounds that the sovereign may find it easier to raise domestic 
currency denominated resources in times of stress. (In extremis they can always print 
money.) Corruption appears to be important for explaining these rating gaps: the greater 
perceived corruption, the smaller the rating advantage to local currency bonds. In addition, 
countries with higher investment rates, and therefore, presumably, superior growth 
prospects, receive more favourable ratings for their domestic currency bonds, relative to their 
foreign currency counterparts. There are also important differences between S&P and 
Moody’s in how they calibrate this rating gap, suggesting that the market still has some way 
to go in arriving at a standard methodology for rating local currency bonds. 
One response to dissatisfaction with the global rating agencies is to develop local 
counterparts. The performance of local rating agencies, one or more of which now exists in 
most Asian countries, is analysed by Daekeun Park and Changyong Rhee. Park and Rhee 
argue for standardising the rating systems used by these agencies and creating a pan-Asian 
settlement system as a way of fostering the development of a pan-regional bond market. 
Their case for local agencies is based on local knowledge and on the observation that global 
agencies like S&P, Moody’s and Fitch do not find it worthwhile to provide ratings for the 
multitude of small local issuers that comprise the most rapidly growing segment of Asian 
borrowing. Unfortunately, local agencies in different countries follow incompatible practices, 
assigning government bonds the highest credit ratings and rating other entities’ ratings below 
that sovereign ceiling. Since sovereign creditworthiness differs across countries, this renders 
ratings of corporate creditworthiness incomparable. Harmonising practices and abandoning 
the sovereign ceiling would help, but this is easier said than done.
20  
Park and Rhee also consider whether the underprovision of clearing, settlement and 
depository services is an obstacle to the development of regional bond markets. They 
compare the advantages of clearing and settling cross-border transactions using local 
agents, global custodians and cross-border settlement systems operated by international 
central securities depositories (ICSDs) like Euroclear and Clearstream. Local custodians 
must be hired in each relevant market, and the quality of their services varies. Global 
custodians essentially do little more than arrange local custodians for their clients. ICSDs 
avoid this duplication and quality variation but have limited coverage in Asia, partly because 
of regulatory restrictions on financial transactions in various Asian countries. In addition, time 
zone differences mean that Euroclear and Clearstream do not provide real-time clearing for 
many Asian transactions. Park and Rhee argue for the creation of an Asian clearing and 
settlement system to rectify these problems. The question is whether creating a new system 
is really necessary or whether existing networks like Euroclear would provide an expanding 
range of services if Asian countries simply relaxed regulatory restrictions on financial 
transactions and the volume of bond market turnover increased. 
Frank Braeckevelt also finds much to criticise in these areas, describing Asia’s clearing and 
settlement infrastructure as opaque and fragmented. But he does not find that infrastructure 
is the principal barrier to the development of efficient bond markets in Asia; despite their 
fragmentation, existing clearing and settlement systems operate relatively well. Rather, the 
principal barriers to the development of regional bond markets, Braeckevelt concludes, are 
capital controls that limit the participation of foreign investors, along with factors limiting 
market liquidity such as the absence of incentives for Asian institutions to actively manage 
                                                  
20   In any case, it is not clear that local rating agencies provide a meaningful alternative to global agencies, since 
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their portfolios. This is consistent with the view that clearing and settlement issues, rather 
than requiring the development of an Asian clearing system, could be resolved by relaxing 
regulatory restrictions and encouraging additional market liquidity and turnover. 
Finally, the paper by Bernhard Eschweiler analyses the role played by supervision and 
regulation in the development of Asian bond markets. Eschweiler finds that supervision and 
regulation in the region increasingly resemble global practices, in both structure and content. 
At the same time, there is considerable variation within Asia in the quality of regulation, Hong 
Kong and Singapore being the only countries that are fully compliant with global standards 
and best practices. Where other Asian countries tend to fall down is not so much in the 
design of regulation as in its enforcement, reflecting weaknesses in legal systems and 
creditor rights. Eschweiler concludes that the fastest route to developing bond markets in 
Asia is not through efforts to harmonise market rules and regulations but rather through the 
adoption and implementation of global best practices at the national level. 
Given this variety of viewpoints and conclusions, it will be evident that there is less than 
complete consensus on the priority actions that should be taken to effectively foster the 
development of bond markets in Asia. If there is one thing on which observers agree, it is 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai’s point that the slow growth of Asian bond markets is a 
problem with multiple dimensions whose solution requires multiple interventions: 
strengthening creditor rights, building stronger market infrastructure, improving regulatory 
design and enforcement, and removing the capital controls and tax measures that limit 
foreign issuance and investor participation - while adapting macroeconomic policies, 
including the exchange rate regime, to the reality of financial integration. The small scale of 
many Asian economies and financial markets also remains a barrier to the development of 
deep and liquid local markets at the national level; on this too there is agreement, although 
there is no consensus, at least yet, on whether this means that priority should be attached to 
harmonising bond market rules, integrating clearing and settlement systems, and creating 
pan-Asian standards for rating agencies so that market growth can proceed at the regional 
rather than the national level. Clearly, there is no shortage of positive steps that can be taken 
to promote the development of Asian bond markets. The key task going forward is to identify 
which such measures should be priorities. 
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